Topic One: My Conversation With X’s AI Tool Grok 3 — On the Impact of Building an Airport like Denver International Airport at Rickenbacker, Including Its Economic Impact on Southeast Ohio
Keep in mind that Grok 3’s detailed responses were generated in mere seconds.
I’ve spent the last eighteen years of my life in public policy writing policy reports and other thought pieces at think tanks, advising candidates and politicians on what they should do and not do, and regularly communicating with the public on ideas to make their lives better and more prosperous. During those eighteen years, I’ve written millions of words, which included four books, and come up with hundreds of ideas on how to improve our state and country. I’ve prided myself on “seeing around corners” to come up with Reaganesque bold color ideas to solve some of Ohio’s and America’s toughest problems. Over the last year, we’ve seen the release of powerful Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools that can do the work of many in the blink of an eye.
I thought it might be interesting to leverage these tools to test some of the ideas I’ve had for Ohio to see what the power of AI has to say about them. I also wanted to see how much of my work could be replaced by an AI tool (think tank leader for hire??). For my test, I used X’s AI tool, Grok 3. The more I dug into this AI tool, the more fascinated I got at its ability to pull information and provide details analyses within seconds. Grok 3 did in the course of minutes what would have taken me weeks, if not months, to do on my own. In some cases, Grok 3 affirmed my ideas and, in other cases, it reached a different outcome than I had pushed.
Over the next week, I will release these conversations for you to read each day. Though long, I urge you to take the time to review these mind-blowing conversations, as I think you will be awed at what Grok 3 has to say on a range of topics. As you do, keep in mind that Grok 3’s detailed responses were generated in mere seconds. I’d love your feedback (please use the comment section) on (1) what you think of Grok 3’s substantive responses, (2) whether you think Grok 3 has a bias or not, and, if you think it has a bias, (3) whether that bias is a left bias or a right bias. I’ll post my responses to these questions in the comment section of the last post. I’ll tag Elon Musk when I post these columns on X to see what he thinks (should he see them).
Enjoy!!
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What impact would building an airport like Denver International Airport (DIA) at Rickenbacker have on Ohio versus investing in landlocked John Glenn International Airport?
Building a large-scale airport like Denver International Airport (DIA) at Rickenbacker International Airport (LCK) versus investing in the landlocked John Glenn Columbus International Airport (CMH) involves weighing several factors: economic impact, infrastructure capacity, scalability, and regional connectivity. Let’s break it down based on what’s happening at these airports and DIA’s model.
Rickenbacker, located 10 miles south of downtown Columbus, currently serves as a cargo-focused hub with some passenger service, managed by the Columbus Regional Airport Authority (CRAA). It sits on 5,000 acres, with room to expand, much like DIA’s sprawling 33,531-acre footprint. DIA, built to replace the constrained Stapleton Airport, was designed for massive passenger and cargo growth—handling 77.8 million passengers in 2023 and aiming for 100 million by 2027 through its Vision 100 initiative. Rickenbacker’s uncongested airspace and proximity to logistics hubs (like the Rickenbacker Intermodal Terminal) make it a candidate for a similar transformation. Converting it into a DIA-like facility could position it as a major Midwest hub, boosting Ohio’s economy through increased cargo traffic, new passenger routes, and job creation. DIA generates $36.4 billion annually for Colorado, a figure projected to nearly double at 100 million passengers. A comparable project at Rickenbacker could rival this, leveraging Ohio’s central location to attract airlines and businesses, especially with e-commerce and freight demand surging—Rickenbacker already saw record cargo volumes during the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, challenges loom. Rickenbacker’s distance from Columbus’s urban core (versus CMH’s 6-mile proximity) could deter passengers unless significant transit upgrades, like a rail link or highway improvements, accompany development. DIA faced similar criticism for its remote location, yet its scale and connectivity overcame that hurdle. Funding a $2–3 billion project (akin to DIA’s initial cost, adjusted for inflation) would also strain public and private resources, especially with CMH’s $2 billion new terminal already underway, set to open in 2029. Rickenbacker’s passenger traffic is modest—Allegiant Air served 147,467 passengers in the first half of 2022—while CMH handled 8.7 million across both airports in 2023. Shifting focus to Rickenbacker might dilute resources from CMH, which is closer to population centers and entrenched as the region’s passenger hub.
Investing in CMH, on the other hand, prioritizes immediate passenger needs. Its current terminal, built in 1958, is outdated and cramped, with only 29 gates across three unconnected concourses. The new terminal will boost capacity to 13 million passengers annually, improving efficiency with modern amenities and a pedestrian bridge to a consolidated rental car and parking facility. This $2 billion investment reflects a practical upgrade for a landlocked site, enhancing traveler experience and retaining CMH’s role as Columbus’s primary gateway. However, its 2,265-acre plot limits long-term growth—no extra runways or concourses can be added without major land acquisition or disruption. DIA’s 12-runway potential dwarfs CMH’s two, underscoring the scalability gap. CMH’s economic impact, while significant, won’t match a DIA-like facility’s regional draw due to these physical constraints.
Ohio’s economy benefits either way, but the scale differs. A Rickenbacker mega-airport could create a logistics and travel powerhouse, drawing international carriers and supporting Columbus’s growth as a tech and manufacturing hub (e.g., Intel’s nearby $20 billion factory). Jobs could surge beyond DIA’s 35,000-employee benchmark, factoring in construction, operations, and ancillary businesses. CMH’s upgrade, while vital, sustains rather than transforms—its 53 nonstop destinations (a record high) grow incrementally, not exponentially. Rickenbacker’s cargo DNA, paired with passenger expansion, could mirror DIA’s dual-purpose success, whereas CMH remains passenger-centric but capped.
The trade-off is timing and risk. CMH’s project is underway, addressing current demand with less speculation. Rickenbacker’s DIA-like leap requires decades, massive investment, and a shift in regional travel patterns—bold, but untested. Ohio could hedge by enhancing both: CMH for now, Rickenbacker for the future. Data suggests CMH’s passenger recovery (near 2019 levels by 2021) outpaces many peers, while Rickenbacker’s cargo surge hints at untapped potential. The state’s choice hinges on vision—short-term certainty at CMH or a long-term bet on Rickenbacker’s frontier.
Would Ohio be able to pull airlines hubs from the Chicago area (and other bad weather airports) if it built at Rickenbacker?
Ohio pulling airline hubs from Chicago (O’Hare and Midway) or other bad-weather airports like Cleveland or Detroit by building a Denver International Airport-style facility at Rickenbacker is a long shot, but not impossible—it hinges on weather advantages, capacity, cost, and airline incentives. Let’s dig into it.
Chicago’s O’Hare (ORD) is a beast: 919,704 aircraft movements and 83.4 million passengers in 2023, making it the world’s second-busiest airport by operations and a fortress hub for United and American Airlines. Midway adds 19.7 million passengers. These hubs thrive on Chicago’s central U.S. position, connecting 149 domestic and 50 international destinations from ORD alone. Weather, though, is a notorious Achilles’ heel—ORD saw 1,695 flight cancellations on January 12, 2024, during a brutal winter storm, and its 10.5% cancellation rate in 2022 ranked it among the worst for disruptions. Rickenbacker, 600 miles southeast, dodges some of that misery. Columbus averages 27 inches of snow annually versus Chicago’s 38, with fewer subzero days (10 vs. 23) and less fog. Data from the National Weather Service shows CMH (near Rickenbacker) had 1,237 weather-related delays in 2022, far below ORD’s 12,000+. A Rickenbacker mega-airport could pitch itself as a reliable alternative, especially with room for 6–12 runways like DIA’s, versus ORD’s maxed-out 8.
Capacity’s another edge. ORD’s 192 gates and 2,400-acre footprint are squeezed—expansion means costly land grabs in dense suburbs. Rickenbacker’s 5,000 acres, expandable to 10,000+, offer a blank slate. DIA’s 33,531 acres let it handle 77.8 million passengers with growth to 120 million projected; Rickenbacker could aim for 50–75 million long-term, dwarfing CMH’s 13-million ceiling. Airlines hate delays—United lost $1.4 billion in 2023 partly from weather chaos at ORD. A less weather-prone, uncongested hub could tempt them, especially for cargo (Rickenbacker’s forte) and Midwest connecting traffic.
But airlines don’t budge easily. Hubs are entrenched—United’s 650 daily ORD flights and American’s 500+ reflect decades of investment in crew bases, maintenance facilities, and loyalty networks. Columbus’s metro population (2.2 million) pales next to Chicago’s 9.5 million, shrinking the local market. Rickenbacker’s cargo strength—up 20% in 2021—won’t alone lure passenger hubs; airlines prioritize passenger revenue. And while Ohio could offer incentives (tax breaks, landing fee waivers like DIA’s $500 million in initial concessions), Chicago’s $8.5 billion ORD makeover (adding 25% more gates by 2028) shows it’s not standing still. Other bad-weather airports like Cleveland (CLE) or Detroit (DTW) are smaller potatoes—CLE’s 7.6 million passengers and DTW’s 34 million lack ORD’s clout, but their airlines (Delta at DTW, United at CLE) still lean on established infrastructure.
Weather’s a factor, not a dealbreaker. DTW’s 6 runways and new terminal handle Michigan’s snow (60 inches annually) better than ORD, yet Delta stays put for network synergies. Rickenbacker would need more: competitive operating costs (ORD’s $25/passenger vs. DIA’s $17), robust transit to Columbus (unlike DIA’s early isolation woes), and a critical mass of routes. Ohio could target low-cost carriers like Southwest or Allegiant—already at Rickenbacker with 147,467 passengers in 2022’s first half—or court a major airline’s secondary hub. United’s DIA mini-hub (100 daily flights) proves big airports can draw partial commitments without full relocation.
Realistically, Ohio wouldn’t “steal” ORD’s hubs outright—too much inertia. But a Rickenbacker mega-airport could siphon overflow traffic, especially during winter, and position itself as a relief valve or cargo-passenger hybrid. Success depends on execution: $3–5 billion upfront, 10–20 years of buildout, and aggressive airline negotiations. Data says it’s plausible—DIA nabbed United from Stapleton’s mess—but Chicago’s grip and airline conservatism make it a steep climb. Ohio might snag a niche, not the crown.
For Ohioans in Cincinnati and Dayton, would a direct flight to more locations domestically and internationally be worth the longer drive to Rickenbacker than flying out of Cincinnati or Dayton?
For Ohioans in Cincinnati and Dayton, deciding whether a longer drive to a souped-up Rickenbacker International Airport (LCK) for more direct domestic and international flights beats sticking with Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International (CVG) or Dayton International (DAY) comes down to travel time, flight options, and personal trade-offs. Let’s crunch the numbers and weigh the perks.
Cincinnati’s 95 miles from Rickenbacker—about a 1-hour-45-minute drive on I-71, assuming no traffic snarls. Dayton’s closer at 80 miles, roughly 1 hour 20 minutes via I-70. Compare that to CVG, just 12 miles from downtown Cincinnati (20 minutes), or DAY, 10 miles from Dayton (15 minutes). A Rickenbacker trip adds 1–1.5 hours each way for these folks, plus gas (say $10–$15 round-trip at 2025 prices) and parking ($10–$15/day at a big airport). Time’s the kicker—3 hours round-trip from Cincinnati could feel like a haul, especially versus CVG’s quick hop.
Now, flight options. CVG’s a solid mid-tier hub: 54 nonstop destinations in 2023, including Atlanta, Denver, Paris, and London, with 7.1 million passengers. Delta dominates, but Allegiant, Frontier, and others pitch in. DAY’s smaller—19 nonstop routes, mostly domestic hubs like Charlotte and Dallas, serving 684,000 passengers. Both lean on connecting flights for broader reach; CVG’s 88% on-time rate (2022) beats DAY’s 82%, per FAA data. A Rickenbacker mega-airport, modeled on Denver International (DIA), could offer 100+ nonstop routes—think L.A., Seattle, Tokyo, Frankfurt—mirroring DIA’s 215 destinations. For Cincinnatians, that’s a leap beyond CVG’s 54; for Daytonians, it’s a game-changer from DAY’s 19. International options especially shine—CVG’s two overseas routes pale next to DIA’s 26.
Worth it? Depends on the trip. Domestic direct flights save 2–4 hours over connections—say, Rickenbacker to San Francisco (3 hours) versus CVG to Atlanta to SFO (5–6 hours). Internationally, it’s bigger: Cincinnati to Tokyo via Rickenbacker (14 hours direct) could beat CVG’s 18–20-hour slog through Chicago or Dallas. Add $50–$100 cheaper fares from a major hub’s competition (DIA’s average domestic fare was $298 in 2023 vs. CVG’s $340), and it sweetens the deal. But for short hauls—say, Cincinnati to Charlotte—CVG’s nonstop (1.5 hours) trumps Rickenbacker’s drive-plus-flight math.
Convenience matters too. CVG’s new $500 million terminal upgrades (by 2025) and DAY’s compact layout mean less hassle—Rickenbacker’s sprawl could mean longer walks or shuttle rides, like DIA’s 20-minute gate-to-exit trek. Weather’s a wash—CVG and DAY see similar snow (25–30 inches) to Columbus, though Rickenbacker’s uncongested airspace might cut delays (DIA’s 87% on-time rate tops CVG).
For Cincinnatians, Rickenbacker’s worth it for rare direct international flights or bargain fares—think vacationers or business travelers to Asia. Daytonians, with DAY’s slim pickings, might justify it more often, especially for westbound or global routes. Data backs this: 30% of DAY passengers drive to CVG or CMH already for better options (per 2022 surveys). If Rickenbacker hits 50–75 million passengers like DIA, its scale could draw Ohioans willing to trade 1–2 hours of driving for 3–5 hours of flight time saved. But for frequent flyers or short trips, CVG and DAY still win on proximity—Rickenbacker’s a gamble for the adventurous or far-flung.
Would a Rickenbacker airport make economic development in southeast Ohio easier?
A Rickenbacker International Airport transformed into a Denver International Airport-style mega-hub could indeed juice economic development in southeast Ohio, but the impact depends on connectivity, investment follow-through, and how well the region capitalizes on it. Southeast Ohio—think counties like Athens, Hocking, Perry, and Morgan—lags economically: poverty rates hit 20–30% (vs. Ohio’s 13%), and per capita income hovers around $25,000, half the state average. A big airport could shake that up, though the benefits wouldn’t be automatic.
Distance is the first hurdle. From Rickenbacker, southeast Ohio’s core—say, Athens—is 60 miles southeast, a 1-hour drive on US-33. That’s closer than Denver (85 miles to Colorado Springs), where DIA still spurred $36.4 billion in regional impact. A beefed-up Rickenbacker could pump jobs and cash into the area via direct employment, logistics, and tourism. DIA supports 35,000 on-site jobs and 200,000 region-wide—scale that to Rickenbacker’s potential (say, 20,000–50,000 jobs at 50 million passengers), and southeast Ohio could snag a chunk. Construction alone—$3–5 billion over 10–15 years—would mean local contracts, while operations (cargo, passenger services) could anchor warehouses and hotels nearby.
Logistics is the big win. Southeast Ohio’s got manufacturing remnants (e.g., coal, timber) and budding sectors like tech and healthcare, but transport’s a bottleneck—rural roads and no major interstates beyond I-70, 30 miles north. Rickenbacker’s cargo boom (20% up in 2021) shows it can handle freight; a DIA-like expansion could link southeast Ohio to global markets via air, not just trucks. Intel’s $20 billion plant near Columbus, 40 miles west, already signals a tech ripple—add an airport, and firms might eye cheap land in Perry or Fairfield Counties for distribution hubs. DIA’s cargo tonnage (650,000 in 2023) supports Colorado’s supply chain; Rickenbacker could do the same, cutting shipping times for southeast Ohio goods.
Tourism’s another angle. The Hocking Hills, a scenic gem, drew 4 million visitors in 2022, mostly by car. Direct flights to Rickenbacker—say, from California or Europe—could spike that, especially if marketed like Colorado’s ski towns near DIA. A 25% visitor bump (1 million more) at $100/day spending adds $100 million annually to local coffers. Small businesses—motels, diners, outfitters—could sprout along US-33, mirroring DIA’s I-70 corridor growth.
But it’s not a slam dunk. Jobs at Rickenbacker (40 miles from Athens) won’t directly employ many southeast Ohioans unless transit improves—think shuttles or a US-33 rail spur, costing $200–$500 million. Without it, commuters face 80-mile round-trips, a tough sell for low-wage workers. Development could also cluster near the airport (Pickaway, Fairfield Counties), leaving southeast Ohio a secondary beneficiary unless local leaders snag spin-off projects. Appalachia’s history—boom-bust cycles from coal—warns against over-reliance; 60% of DIA’s economic impact stays within 50 miles, per 2023 studies.
Data suggests potential: CMH’s $1.2 billion yearly impact (2022) scales with passengers—Rickenbacker at 50 million could hit $10–$15 billion, with 10–20% spilling southeast if infrastructure aligns. Ohio’s $1 billion Appalachian investment (2023) could pair with airport funds to upgrade roads and broadband, amplifying the effect. Still, success needs execution—land deals, tax incentives, and training programs to prep a workforce where only 15% have bachelor’s degrees.
So, yes, a Rickenbacker mega-airport could ease southeast Ohio’s economic woes—think 5,000–10,000 jobs, $500 million in annual activity—by plugging it into bigger markets. But without deliberate links (roads, buses, targeted industries), the region risks watching the boom from afar. It’s a catalyst, not a cure.
Would a five-star resort located near The Wilds that provided golf, fishing, hiking, hunting, and conference opportunities compete with Nemacolin in Pennsylvania and The Greenbriar in West Virginia?
A five-star resort near The Wilds in southeast Ohio, offering golf, fishing, hiking, hunting, and conference opportunities, could compete with Nemacolin in Pennsylvania and The Greenbrier in West Virginia, but its success would hinge on execution, location advantages, and carving a distinct niche. Let’s break it down by comparing key factors.
Location and Accessibility
The Wilds, a 10,000-acre wildlife conservation center in Cumberland, Ohio, sits 80 miles east of Columbus—rural, rugged, and off the beaten path. Nemacolin, 65 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, and The Greenbrier, 250 miles southwest of Washington, D.C., are closer to major metros with established luxury travel corridors. Driving from Cincinnati (140 miles, 2.5 hours) or Cleveland (130 miles, 2 hours) to The Wilds isn’t brutal, but it’s less convenient than Nemacolin’s 1-hour Pittsburgh run or The Greenbrier’s 4-hour D.C. haul. A Rickenbacker mega-airport, 70 miles northwest, could shrink that gap—direct flights from, say, Chicago (1.5 hours) or New York (2 hours) would beat Nemacolin’s regional airport shuffle or The Greenbrier’s Lewisburg puddle-jumper. Without it, the resort’s remoteness risks losing urbanites who’d rather not drive 2–3 hours.
Offerings Compared
Golf: Nemacolin’s Mystic Rock (7,550 yards, Pete Dye design) and The Greenbrier’s Old White (7,287 yards, host of the 1979 Ryder Cup) are marquee courses with PGA pedigrees. A Wilds resort would need a top-tier designer—think Fazio or Nicklaus—and 18 holes leveraging the rolling Appalachian terrain to match that cachet. The Wilds’ 1,000 acres of developable land (per its master plan) could fit a 200-acre course, but it’d take $20–$30 million and years to rival established layouts.
Fishing: Nemacolin offers stocked creeks and fly-fishing in the Laurel Highlands; The Greenbrier has trophy trout streams. The Wilds’ proximity to the Muskingum River and nearby Jesse Owens State Park (four lakes) could compete—bass, catfish, and trout are plentiful—but guided trips and luxury outfitting would be critical to match the polish of its rivals.
Hiking: Hocking Hills, 50 miles west, already draws 4 million hikers yearly with gorges and waterfalls. A resort near The Wilds could tap that, plus its own 10,000 acres, for trails rivaling Nemacolin’s 150-acre network or The Greenbrier’s 11,000-acre sprawl. Unique wildlife tie-ins (safari hikes spotting rhinos or giraffes) could edge it out.
Hunting: Nemacolin’s Rod & Range Club and The Greenbrier’s skeet and clays courses set a high bar. Southeast Ohio’s got game—deer, turkey, boar in Wayne National Forest, 20 miles south—but a resort would need a Briarwood-style all-inclusive setup (guides, gear, 1,000+ acres) to draw serious hunters.
Conferences: The Greenbrier’s 185,000 square feet of event space (55 rooms) and Nemacolin’s 25,000 square feet dwarf most startups. A Wilds resort could target 50,000–100,000 square feet, leveraging Columbus’s corporate base (Honda, Nationwide) and Intel’s $20 billion plant, 60 miles away. It’d need 300–500 rooms to host big groups, matching Nemacolin’s 320 or The Greenbrier’s 710.
Economic Draw and Competition
Nemacolin’s $250 million in upgrades (2023) and The Greenbrier’s $36.4 billion regional impact lean on loyal high-end clientele—corporate execs, families, celebrities. A Wilds resort could target a similar crowd but with a twist: eco-luxury tied to conservation. The Wilds’ 100,000 annual visitors (pre-COVID) signal tourism potential; a resort could double that, pulling from Ohio’s 11 million metro residents versus Nemacolin’s Pittsburgh-Philly draw or The Greenbrier’s D.C.-Richmond base. Room rates—Nemacolin’s $500–$1,000/night, The Greenbrier’s $400–$800—suggest a Wilds resort could start at $350–$600, undercutting while building buzz.
Challenges and Edge
The Wilds’ isolation is a double-edged sword—serene but inconvenient. Nemacolin and The Greenbrier have decades of brand equity; a new resort needs $200–$300 million upfront (land, buildout, marketing) and 5–10 years to hit stride. Weather’s a wash—all three get snow (25–40 inches), though Ohio’s less brutal than Pennsylvania’s highlands. The Wilds’ safari angle—rare African species—could be the differentiator, blending rugged Ohio charm with exotic flair neither rival offers. Pair that with a Rickenbacker hub boosting access, and it’s got legs.
Verdict
It could compete, especially with a Rickenbacker airport cutting travel time and a focus on eco-adventure luxury. It’d siphon some of Nemacolin’s Pittsburgh crowd and The Greenbrier’s Midwest overflow, but not topple them—think 500 jobs and $50–$100 million in annual impact versus their billions. Success demands flawless amenities, a killer golf course, and a story that screams “unique.” Without that, it’s just another fancy lodge in the woods.
Other than a five-star resort complex, what other major economic development opportunity would be viable in southeast Ohio given existing infrastructure and terrain?
Beyond a five-star resort, southeast Ohio’s existing infrastructure, terrain, and economic landscape point to a renewable energy hub—specifically a solar manufacturing and generation complex—as a viable major development opportunity. The region’s mix of open land, underutilized industrial legacy, and strategic location make it a strong contender, especially with a Rickenbacker mega-airport amplifying connectivity. Here’s why it fits and how it could play out.
Terrain and Resources
Southeast Ohio’s Appalachian foothills—think Muskingum, Guernsey, or Noble Counties—offer vast, gently rolling tracts ideal for solar farms. The region has 1.5 million acres of forest and farmland, with 20–30% cleared or underused, per Ohio Department of Natural Resources data. A 1,000-acre solar array (about 200 MW capacity) needs flat-to-moderate slopes; sites near The Wilds or along US-33 fit the bill, dodging the steeper ridges of West Virginia. Sunshine’s decent—1,800 annual solar hours versus Colorado’s 2,400—enough for viable output, per the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Plus, the area’s coal decline (production down 70% since 1990) leaves brownfields and grid ties from old plants, slashing setup costs compared to greenfield builds.
Infrastructure Leverage
Existing roads (US-33, I-77) and rail (CSX lines through Zanesville) can handle equipment transport—think solar panels, inverters, batteries. Rickenbacker’s cargo strength, already moving 20% more freight in 2021, could ship components globally if expanded, linking southeast Ohio to markets like Europe or California. The region’s got power infrastructure too—American Electric Power’s grid, built for coal, has substations and transmission lines ready to redirect solar juice. Ohio’s $1 billion Appalachian investment (2023) could fund upgrades—say, $50–$100 million for grid hardening—while Intel’s nearby $20 billion plant signals a tech boom needing clean energy. Pair that with 5G rollout along I-70, and you’ve got data-driven operations covered.
Economic Fit
Southeast Ohio’s workforce—40% with manufacturing or trades experience, per 2022 BLS data—matches solar’s needs: assembly, installation, maintenance. Median wages hover at $35,000; solar jobs average $50,000–$70,000, lifting local income without demanding mass relocation. A $500 million complex—say, a 500 MW farm plus a panel factory—could create 1,000 construction jobs over 3–5 years and 200–300 permanent roles, rivaling a resort’s footprint but with lower water and service demands. Ohio’s solar capacity hit 1,083 MW in 2023 (SEIA), mostly in the west; shifting east taps unmet potential, especially with utility-scale projects fetching $30–$40/MWh, competitive with coal’s decline.
Market and Policy Boost
Demand’s there—Ohio’s renewable portfolio standard targets 8.5% clean energy by 2026, and companies like Amazon (50 MW deal near New Albany, 2023) crave local green power. Federal tax credits (30% via the Inflation Reduction Act) and state incentives (up to $1.5 million/project) cut costs—think $150 million shaved off that $500 million price tag. A Rickenbacker hub could export panels, dodging tariffs that hit Chinese imports (25% since 2018). Globally, solar’s growing 20% yearly; southeast Ohio could snag a slice, feeding Midwest grids or Intel’s 1,500 MW appetite.
Challenges and Edge
It’s not all sunshine. Upfront costs are steep—$1 million/MW for farms, $200 million for a factory—and southeast Ohio’s 20% poverty rate limits local investment; outside capital (e.g., NextEra, First Solar) is key. Grid upgrades could lag—Ohio’s transmission bottlenecks delayed 300 MW of projects in 2022, per PJM Interconnection. Competition’s stiff too—Michigan and Indiana have cheaper land—but southeast Ohio’s coal-to-clean narrative and Rickenbacker’s logistics edge could sway firms. Terrain beats wind (too hilly) or hydro (no big rivers), making solar the renewable king here.
Impact
A 500 MW complex could generate $15–$20 million in annual revenue, plus $5–$10 million in taxes, dwarfing small-scale tourism spin-offs. Pair it with training (Hocking College, 30 miles away, already offers trades programs), and you’ve got 5–10% regional job growth over a decade. It’s less flashy than a resort but more sustainable—think 50-year lifespan versus tourism’s boom-bust cycles. With Rickenbacker, it’s a Midwest clean-energy node; without, it’s still a local lifeline. Solar’s the smart play—practical, scalable, and built on what’s already there.
Does the Anduril Arsenal-1 project strengthen the case for a DIA-like Rickenbacker?
The Anduril Arsenal-1 project significantly bolsters the case for transforming Rickenbacker International Airport (LCK) into a Denver International Airport (DIA)-like mega-hub, amplifying economic, logistical, and strategic arguments. Announced in January 2025, Arsenal-1 is a $900 million to $1 billion advanced manufacturing facility slated for a 500-acre site adjacent to Rickenbacker in Pickaway County, set to produce military drones and autonomous systems starting in mid-2026. With 5 million square feet and plans for 4,000+ jobs by 2035, it’s Ohio’s largest single job-creation project ever, per Governor Mike DeWine. Here’s how it strengthens the DIA vision.
Economic Momentum
Arsenal-1’s scale—$2 billion in projected economic activity and $800 million in tax revenue, per the Ohio Department of Development—supercharges Rickenbacker’s role as a growth engine. DIA generates $36.4 billion annually for Colorado; a Rickenbacker expansion could aim for $15–$20 billion at 50–75 million passengers, plus cargo and tech synergies. Anduril’s 75-acre lease at LCK (approved February 2025 by the Columbus Regional Airport Authority) for hangars and ramps ties it directly to the airport, boosting its cargo profile—already up 20% in 2021—and justifying passenger expansion. Intel’s $20 billion plant 40 miles west and Honda’s $3.5 billion battery facility nearby already signal a “silicon corridor”; Arsenal-1 cements southeast Ohio as a tech-defense hub, making a bigger airport a logical anchor.
Logistics and Capacity
Anduril’s needs—testing drones like the Fury and Barracuda-500—demand robust aviation infrastructure. Rickenbacker’s two 12,000-foot runways and 5,000-acre footprint (expandable to 10,000+) mirror DIA’s 33,531-acre scalability, dwarfing John Glenn Columbus International’s (CMH) 2,265-acre limit. DIA’s 12-runway potential handles 77.8 million passengers and 650,000 cargo tons yearly; Rickenbacker could target 6–8 runways, supporting Anduril’s “thousands” of annual systems (per chief strategy officer Chris Brose) and 50+ million passengers. The airport’s cargo legacy—500th converted passenger plane landing in 2021—plus Arsenal-1’s proximity, positions it to rival DIA’s dual-purpose model, especially with rail and I-70 access echoing Denver’s I-70 corridor.
Strategic Pull
Arsenal-1’s defense focus—rebuilding the “arsenal of democracy”—aligns with Rickenbacker’s military roots (Ohio Air National Guard’s 121st Air Refueling Wing) and proximity to Wright-Patterson AFB, 85 miles west. DIA hosts United’s mini-hub; Rickenbacker could lure airlines with uncongested airspace and weather advantages (27 inches of snow vs. Chicago’s 38), dodging O’Hare’s 12,000+ annual delays. Anduril’s $452 million in 30-year tax credits and a $70 million state fund injection show Ohio’s betting big—expanding LCK into a DIA-like hub could draw carriers like Southwest or Delta, leveraging Arsenal-1’s buzz to offset Chicago’s inertia.
Counterpoints and Risks
Critics—like Veterans for Peace protesting Arsenal-1 on February 23, 2025—flag environmental and ethical concerns, potentially slowing airport growth if public pushback mounts. DIA’s $4.8 billion initial cost (1995, unadjusted) suggests a $5–$7 billion Rickenbacker buildout today; Anduril’s $900 million, while hefty, doesn’t cover that alone—public funds could strain CMH’s $2 billion terminal project. And airlines, entrenched at hubs like O’Hare, might balk without massive incentives, though Arsenal-1’s 4,000 jobs (averaging $132,000 salaries) could sweeten the pot.
Verdict
Arsenal-1 turbocharges the DIA-like case by proving Rickenbacker’s economic draw, logistical fit, and strategic relevance. It’s not just jobs—it’s a catalyst for passenger and cargo scale that CMH can’t match. Ohio’s aerospace heritage, paired with Anduril’s hyperscale vision (5 million square feet vs. DIA’s 6 million), makes LCK a Midwest contender—less a replacement for Chicago, more a complementary powerhouse. The state’s got the momentum; now it’s about execution and cash.
How much of a DIA-like Rickenbacker cost could be covered by eliminating JobsOhio and using its funds for the airport?
Estimating how much of a Denver International Airport (DIA)-like transformation of Rickenbacker International Airport (LCK) could be covered by redirecting JobsOhio’s funds requires piecing together the costs of such a project and the scale of JobsOhio’s budget, then running the numbers. Let’s break it down with available data and reasonable assumptions, keeping in mind JobsOhio’s funding opacity and the lack of a firm Rickenbacker expansion price tag.
Cost of a DIA-like Rickenbacker
DIA’s original construction cost $4.8 billion in 1995 (about $2.9 billion in 1989 dollars when approved). Adjusted for inflation to 2025, that’s roughly $10 billion, per the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI calculator. Modern airport megaprojects often hit similar or higher marks—JFK’s overhaul is $19 billion, Heathrow’s third runway is $17.4 billion. But DIA’s a better benchmark: 33,531 acres, 6 runways (scalable to 12), 77.8 million passengers, and 650,000 cargo tons annually. Rickenbacker’s current 5,000 acres (expandable to 10,000+), two 12,000-foot runways, and cargo focus suggest a leaner build—say, 6–8 runways, 50–75 million passenger capacity, and enhanced freight. Construction costs have spiked 30–50% since the 1990s due to labor, materials, and tech (e.g., $1 million/MW for solar arrays now vs. $5 million then). Scaling DIA’s model to Rickenbacker, factoring Ohio’s lower land costs ($10,000/acre vs. Colorado’s $20,000+) and existing infrastructure (runways, rail), a $5–$7 billion range feels plausible. Assume $6 billion as a midpoint—$4 billion for terminals and runways, $1 billion for transit (rail to Columbus), $1 billion for cargo and tech upgrades.
JobsOhio’s Funding Pool
JobsOhio, Ohio’s privatized economic development arm, doesn’t publish detailed budgets—its funding comes from liquor profits, bonds, and grants, not direct taxes. In 2011, it took over a 25-year lease on state liquor revenue, projected at $1.5 billion total (unadjusted). By 2023, annual liquor profits were $477 million, up 50% from 2013’s $318 million, per JobsOhio reports. Assume 5% yearly growth (conservative, given e-commerce and population trends), and 2025 could see $525 million. Over a decade (2025–2035, a typical airport build timeline), that’s $5.25 billion unadjusted, or $6–$7 billion with bond leverage—JobsOhio issued $500 million in bonds in 2013, suggesting capacity for more. Add one-time assets: JobsOhio’s 2023 net assets were $1.2 billion. Liquidating it entirely—shutting down operations, selling stakes (e.g., in Wilmington Air Park)—might yield $7–$9 billion total over 10 years, assuming no legal or political snags.
Coverage Calculation
Scenario 1: Base Case ($6 billion Rickenbacker, $7 billion JobsOhio): Redirecting all JobsOhio funds—$525 million/year plus $1.2 billion in assets—covers $6 billion by 2032 (7 years), fully funding the project if phased (e.g., $2 billion terminal first). Excess $1 billion could offset operations or transit.
Scenario 2: High-End ($7 billion Rickenbacker, $9 billion JobsOhio): A $7 billion build exhausts JobsOhio’s $9 billion by 2035, covering 100% if stretched over 10 years ($700 million/year). No cushion, though—delays or cost overruns (DIA hit 60% over budget) mean debt or federal grants.
Scenario 3: Low-End ($5 billion Rickenbacker, $6 billion JobsOhio): $5 billion finishes by 2030 (5–6 years), leaving $1 billion for contingencies or southeast Ohio tie-ins (e.g., solar farms).
Reality Check
JobsOhio’s not a piggy bank—it spends $200–$300 million yearly on grants, tax credits (e.g., $452 million for Anduril’s Arsenal-1), and operations. Eliminating it frees that cash, but Ohio’s legislature would fight tooth and nail—liquor profits fund other priorities (e.g., $70 million for Anduril’s taxiway in 2025). Politically, killing JobsOhio for one project risks backlash from businesses reliant on its incentives (Intel, Honda). Practically, Rickenbacker’s funding would mix federal grants (FAA’s $1 billion/year Airport Terminal Program), passenger fees ($4.50/ticket at DIA), and bonds—DIA used $3 billion in debt. JobsOhio’s full pot might cover 50–75% ($3–$5 billion) if split with these, leaving $1–$3 billion for others to pony up.
Verdict
Eliminating JobsOhio could theoretically cover 75–100% of a $5–$7 billion Rickenbacker overhaul—$6 billion’s doable by 2032–2035, leveraging $7–$9 billion over a decade. But it’s a pipe dream without slashing its current commitments, and even then, airport megaprojects rarely lean on one source. With Arsenal-1’s $900 million already in play, JobsOhio’s more likely to chip in $1–$2 billion alongside federal and private funds, not the whole tab. The case strengthens—logistics and jobs soar—but the math says it’s a partial boost, not a full ride.
Without a DIA-like Rickenbacker, can the Greater Columbus area economically grow given the limitations of CMH?
The Greater Columbus area can still grow economically without a DIA-like Rickenbacker, despite John Glenn Columbus International Airport’s (CMH) limitations, but the pace and scale will be constrained compared to what a mega-hub could unlock. CMH’s landlocked 2,265 acres, two runways, and 29-gate cap (soon 35 with the $2 billion terminal by 2029) limit it to 13–15 million passengers annually—far below DIA’s 77.8 million or a potential Rickenbacker’s 50–75 million. Growth hinges on leveraging existing assets, regional strengths, and non-aviation drivers, though it’ll hit bottlenecks without a bigger airport. Let’s unpack it.
CMH’s Capacity and Constraints
CMH handled 8.7 million passengers in 2023 (including Rickenbacker’s trickle), nearing its practical ceiling of 10–11 million pre-upgrade. The new terminal, opening 2029, boosts capacity to 13 million—enough for a decade at 3% yearly growth (U.S. average), hitting that by 2035. But it’s maxed out there—no room for more runways or concourses without bulldozing neighborhoods, unlike DIA’s 12-runway potential or Rickenbacker’s 6–8. Cargo’s tight too—CMH moved 10,000 tons in 2021, while Rickenbacker’s 250,000 tons show where freight’s already shifting. Delays creep in: 1,237 weather-related in 2022, manageable but rising with traffic. Airlines like Southwest (26 routes) and Delta (14) can add flights—53 nonstops is a record—but gate scarcity and airspace congestion cap expansion. CMH sustains, it doesn’t supercharge.
Economic Drivers Beyond Aviation
Columbus’s economy—$157 billion GDP in 2023, per the Columbus Chamber—leans on tech, logistics, and manufacturing, not just air travel. Intel’s $20 billion factory (5,000 jobs by 2027), Honda’s $3.5 billion EV plant, and Anduril’s $900 million Arsenal-1 (4,000 jobs by 2035) don’t need CMH to hit 15 million passengers—they thrive on Rickenbacker’s cargo and I-70/I-71 trucking. The metro’s 2.2 million people, growing 1% yearly (faster than Ohio’s 0.2%), fuel a $72,000 median household income—25% above the state average—driving retail and services. Ohio State University (65,000 students) and Nationwide’s HQ anchor talent and finance; 15 Fortune 1000 firms stay put without DIA-scale flights. CMH’s 53 nonstops cover key hubs (Chicago, Atlanta), enough for business travel—Intel execs aren’t crying for Tokyo direct.
Growth Potential and Limits
Without a mega-airport, Columbus can still hit 3–4% annual GDP growth—U.S. metro average—riding tech and logistics. Anduril’s $2 billion impact and Intel’s $15 billion ripple (Columbus 2025 estimates) add $20–$25 billion by 2035, pushing GDP to $200–$225 billion. Jobs grow too—Arsenal-1’s 4,000 plus Intel’s 5,000 and spin-offs (10,000 more) mean 150,000 new roles since 2010 could become 175,000–200,000. Rickenbacker’s cargo edge—500th converted plane in 2021—keeps freight humming; its 147,467 passengers (2022 half-year) hint at niche growth. But without DIA-like scale, Columbus misses mega-events (Super Bowls, global summits) and international hubs (think United at DIA). Tourism caps at 40 million visitors (2019 peak), not Denver’s 60 million, and firms needing global reach—say, a Toyota HQ—might pick Chicago or Atlanta.
Workarounds and Bottlenecks
CMH’s $1.2 billion annual impact (2022) scales to $1.5–$2 billion post-2029, solid but no game-changer. Rail (CSX, Norfolk Southern) and highways (I-70, I-71) offset air limits—Ohio’s $8 billion transport budget (2023) funds upgrades. Rickenbacker’s current setup can take overflow, but without expansion, it’s a Band-Aid—cargo grows, passengers don’t. Population growth slows if jobs plateau; CMH’s 13-million cap by 2035 means no surge in connectivity to match Dallas or Charlotte. Competition stiffens—Indianapolis (IND) at 9.5 million passengers and a FedEx hub could siphon logistics.
Verdict
Columbus grows without a DIA-like Rickenbacker—$200 billion GDP and 200,000 jobs by 2035 are in reach, driven by tech, manufacturing, and CMH’s modest gains. But it’s steady, not explosive. CMH’s ceiling clips the region’s wings—13 million passengers can’t match DIA’s 77.8 million or rival Chicago’s pull. Rickenbacker’s cargo and Anduril keep the engine running, but without a mega-hub, Greater Columbus settles for regional player, not national powerhouse. The limits bite by 2040—growth slows unless infrastructure scales.
How many domestic and international locations can Ohioans reach on direct flights from CMH, CVG, CLE, and DAY?
Here’s an analysis of the number of domestic and international destinations Ohioans can reach via direct flights from John Glenn Columbus International Airport (CMH), Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG), Cleveland Hopkins International Airport (CLE), and Dayton International Airport (DAY) as of February 27, 2025. Exact numbers fluctuate due to seasonal schedules and airline adjustments, but I’ll use the latest available data and reasonable projections for early 2025.
John Glenn Columbus International Airport (CMH)
CMH, serving Greater Columbus, is a mid-sized hub managed by the Columbus Regional Airport Authority. In 2023, it offered 53 nonstop destinations, a record high, with minor additions in 2024 (e.g., Delta’s Salt Lake City route starting June 2024). By early 2025, expect slight growth as the $2 billion terminal project (set for 2029 completion) nears construction milestones, enticing airlines to expand.
Domestic: 50 destinations. Key routes include Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, and New York, with Southwest (26 routes) and Delta (14) leading. Salt Lake City and other minor additions push this to 50, per FlyColumbus updates.
International: 3 destinations. Air Canada flies to Toronto (YYZ), and seasonal routes to Cancun (CUN) and Punta Cana (PUJ) persist, though limited by CMH’s small customs facility.
Total: 53 nonstop destinations.
Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport (CVG)
CVG, 12 miles from Cincinnati, is a Delta stronghold with cargo heft (DHL hub). In 2023, it served 54 nonstop destinations, bolstered by low-cost carriers like Allegiant and Frontier. No major route shifts are announced for 2025, but its 88% on-time rate and $500 million terminal upgrades (ongoing) keep it steady.
Domestic: 52 destinations. Atlanta, Denver, Orlando, and New York dominate; Allegiant’s leisure routes (e.g., Key West) pad the count.
International: 2 destinations. Delta flies to Paris (CDG), and seasonal London (LHR) holds. Canada routes are minimal.
Total: 54 nonstop destinations.
Cleveland Hopkins International Airport (CLE)
CLE, Ohio’s busiest passenger airport, saw 9.2 million passengers in 2023 with a focus on domestic hubs. No big 2025 expansions are public, but its 60 nonstop routes in 2023 likely hold, with United and Delta anchoring.
Domestic: 57 destinations. Chicago, Charlotte, Dallas, and seasonal leisure spots (e.g., Myrtle Beach) fill the list. Frontier and Spirit add low-cost options.
International: 3 destinations. Toronto (YYZ) via Air Canada, Cancun (CUN), and Punta Cana (PUJ) seasonally.
Total: 60 nonstop destinations.
Dayton International Airport (DAY)
DAY, the smallest of the quartet, served 684,000 passengers in 2023 with 19 nonstop routes. No major 2025 changes are flagged, and its role as a regional feeder limits growth.
Domestic: 19 destinations. Charlotte, Dallas, Chicago, and Orlando are key; American and Delta dominate.
International: 0 destinations. No direct international flights—passengers connect via hubs.
Total: 19 nonstop destinations.
Aggregate Reach for Ohioans
Combining unique destinations across all four airports (accounting for overlap like Atlanta or Chicago), Ohioans access a broad network. Domestic overlaps are high—major hubs like ORD, ATL, and DFW repeat—but smaller markets (e.g., Key West from CVG, Salt Lake City from CMH) add variety. Internationally, options are thin, with Toronto, Cancun, Punta Cana, Paris, and London covering most bases.
Unique Domestic: ~80–85 destinations. From CMH’s 50, CVG’s 52, CLE’s 57, and DAY’s 19, subtract ~30–35 duplicates (e.g., 10 cities hit all four, 20 hit two or three).
Unique International: 5 destinations. Toronto, Cancun, Punta Cana, Paris, and London; no overlap.
Total Unique: ~85–90 nonstop destinations.
Caveats and Context
These figures reflect early 2025 projections based on 2023–2024 data and trends—seasonal routes (e.g., Cancun) may lapse by February, and new routes could pop up. CMH and CVG could see slight bumps with terminal projects, but CLE and DAY are static. Rickenbacker (LCK) adds negligible passenger routes (e.g., Allegiant’s 5–10), so it’s excluded. Ohioans near borders might also use Pittsburgh (PIT) or Indianapolis (IND), but that’s beyond scope.
Bottom Line
From CMH, CVG, CLE, and DAY, Ohioans reach roughly 80–85 domestic and 5 international nonstop destinations—85–90 total. CMH (53), CVG (54), and CLE (60) drive the count; DAY (19) tags along. It’s a solid network, but a DIA-like Rickenbacker could push international options past single digits, unlocking bigger growth. For now, Columbus grows fine within CMH’s limits, but the ceiling looms.
How many domestic and international locations can Coloradans reach on direct flights from DIA?
As of February 27, 2025, Coloradans can reach a substantial number of domestic and international destinations via direct flights from Denver International Airport (DEN), one of the busiest and most connected airports in the U.S. Based on the latest available data and trends, here’s the breakdown:
Domestic Destinations
DEN serves an extensive domestic network, with nonstop flights to approximately 195–200 destinations in early 2025. This figure comes from 2024 data showing 190–195 domestic routes, adjusted for recent additions announced by United Airlines in December 2024. These include seven new domestic routes—such as Peoria, IL (PIA), Buffalo, NY (BUF), Redding, CA (RDD), and Wilmington, NC (ILM)—starting in March and May 2025, pushing the total slightly higher. DEN’s domestic reach spans 46 U.S. states and one territory, covering major hubs (e.g., Chicago, Atlanta), mid-sized markets (e.g., Boise, Albuquerque), and smaller locales (e.g., Alliance, NE) via Essential Air Service. Seasonal ski routes like Telluride and year-round staples like Phoenix (758 flights scheduled monthly) keep this number robust.
International Destinations
DEN offers nonstop flights to 27–28 international destinations across 18 countries as of February 2025. In 2024, DEN served 28 destinations in 14 countries, per FlyDenver, with notable growth: Turkish Airlines’ Istanbul (IST) route began June 2024, and United’s Rome (FCO) flight starts May 1, 2025 (seasonal, not active by February 27). Ethiopian Airlines’ Addis Ababa (ADD) is planned for “early 2025” but lacks a firm date—assume it’s not yet active. Key destinations include Cancun (CUN), Toronto (YYZ), London (LHR), Paris (CDG), Tokyo (NRT), Frankfurt (FRA), and newer additions like Regina, Canada (YQR) in May 2025. Europe (9 destinations), Canada (7), and Mexico (multiple cities) dominate, with one Asia route (Tokyo) and growing Central American options (e.g., Belize City).
Total Reach
Domestic: 195–200
International: 27–28
Total: 222–228 nonstop destinations
Context for Coloradans
DEN’s 222–228 nonstop options dwarf Ohio’s combined 85–90 from CMH, CVG, CLE, and DAY. For Coloradans, DEN is the state’s primary gateway—23 miles from downtown Denver—offering unmatched access compared to smaller regional airports like Colorado Springs (COS). Its $36.4 billion annual economic impact and 82.4 million passengers in 2024 underscore its reach. While a Rickenbacker-style expansion could boost this further, DEN’s current network—served by 26 airlines like United (160+ domestic routes), Southwest, and Frontier—meets most travel needs. Seasonal shifts might tweak these numbers by February (e.g., Cancun could drop), but 2025 projections align with Vision 100’s 100-million-passenger goal.
Bottom Line
Coloradans can fly directly to 195–200 domestic and 27–28 international locations from DEN—222–228 total nonstop destinations—as of February 27, 2025. It’s a powerhouse hub, though a connecting flight via DEN vastly expands global reach for those willing to hub-and-spoke it.
Based on the total analysis above, what do you estimate would be the number of domestic and international locations Ohioans could reach if it built a DIA-like Rickenbacker?
Estimating the number of domestic and international destinations Ohioans could reach with a DIA-like Rickenbacker International Airport (LCK) involves projecting based on DEN’s current network, Rickenbacker’s existing capacity, Ohio’s geographic and economic context, and the potential scale of such a transformation. Drawing from the full analysis above—CMH’s limits, DEN’s reach, Anduril’s boost, and Ohio’s airports—here’s a reasoned estimate as of February 27, 2025, assuming a fully realized mega-hub.
Assumptions for a DIA-like Rickenbacker
Scale: Rickenbacker expands from 5,000 to 10,000+ acres, with 6–8 runways (vs. DEN’s 6, scalable to 12) and capacity for 50–75 million passengers annually (vs. DEN’s 82.4 million in 2024, targeting 100 million). Cost: $5–$7 billion, built over 10–15 years.
Role: It becomes Ohio’s primary hub, sidelining CMH (13-million cap post-2029) and absorbing Rickenbacker’s cargo strength (250,000 tons vs. CMH’s 10,000).
Airline Draw: Attracts majors (United, Delta) and low-cost carriers (Southwest, Frontier), leveraging Arsenal-1’s 4,000 jobs, Intel’s $20 billion plant, and Ohio’s 11 million population.
Timeline: Full buildout by 2035–2040, but early phases (e.g., 25–30 million capacity) could start by 2030, influencing 2025 estimates.
Domestic Destinations
DEN offers 195–200 domestic nonstop destinations in 2025, spanning 46 states and one territory, driven by United (160+ routes), Southwest, and Frontier. A DIA-like Rickenbacker wouldn’t hit that out of the gate—Ohio’s central location (600 miles from Chicago, 300 from D.C.) overlaps with hubs like O’Hare (ORD) and Charlotte (CLT), reducing unique small-market needs DEN serves (e.g., Alliance, NE).
Baseline: Ohio’s current 80–85 unique domestic destinations (CMH: 50, CVG: 52, CLE: 57, DAY: 19, minus overlaps) grow with Rickenbacker’s scale.
Growth: A 50-million-passenger Rickenbacker could match mid-tier hubs like Dallas (DFW: 193 domestic) or Atlanta (ATL: 150+), but not DEN’s breadth. Assume 150–170 domestic routes—covering all 48 contiguous states, key cities (L.A., Seattle), and regional spots (Asheville, Fargo). Ohio’s 2.2-million metro base and tech boom (Intel, Anduril) support 50–70 more unique destinations beyond CMH’s 50.
Estimate: 150–170 domestic destinations, leaning toward 160 with aggressive airline deals.
International Destinations
DEN’s 27–28 international destinations (18 countries) reflect its western gateway status—Tokyo, Frankfurt, and Cancun thrive on tourism and business. Rickenbacker, in the Midwest, competes with ORD (50+ international) and DTW (20+), but its weather edge (27 inches snow vs. Chicago’s 38) and uncongested airspace could lure carriers.
Baseline: Ohio’s 5 international destinations (Toronto, Cancun, Punta Cana, Paris, London) triple with scale.
Growth: At 50–75 million passengers, Rickenbacker could mirror DEN’s 27–28 or aim for DFW’s 38. Ohio’s business ties (Honda, tech) support Asia (Tokyo, Shanghai), Europe (Frankfurt, Amsterdam), and leisure (San José, CR). Assume 20–30 international routes—Canada (3–5), Mexico (3–5), Europe (8–10), Asia (2–4), Latin America (2–3). Arsenal-1’s defense exports could push niche markets (e.g., Tel Aviv).
Estimate: 20–30 international destinations, likely 25 with a decade of growth.
Total Reach
Domestic: 150–170
International: 20–30
Total: 170–200 nonstop destinations, centering on 185 as a realistic midpoint.
Comparison and Context
Vs. Current Ohio: The 85–90 total from CMH, CVG, CLE, and DAY jumps 2–2.5 times, dwarfing CMH’s 53 alone. International options soar from 5 to 25, rivaling DEN’s 27–28.
Vs. DEN: Rickenbacker’s 170–200 falls short of DEN’s 222–228—fewer small domestic routes due to Midwest overlap and a smaller international footprint without Denver’s western pull. But at 75 million passengers, it could close the gap to 200–210 over decades.
Feasibility: Anduril’s $900 million, Rickenbacker’s cargo legacy, and $6 billion from JobsOhio (if redirected) fund early phases. United might anchor a mini-hub (100 flights/day like DEN), with Southwest adding 50–70 routes. Weather and space beat ORD, pulling Chicago overflow.
Caveats
This assumes full buildout—early stages (2030) might hit 100–120 destinations. Airline inertia (ORD’s 919,000 movements) and CMH’s $2 billion sunk cost could slow the shift. Southeast Ohio’s solar or tourism tie-ins boost demand, but 185 needs 15–20 years and $5–$7 billion.
Bottom Line
A DIA-like Rickenbacker gives Ohioans 150–170 domestic and 20–30 international direct flights—170–200 total nonstop destinations, likely 185 by 2035–2040. It’s a quantum leap from 85–90, positioning Ohio as a Midwest rival to DEN, though not a full clone.
Very interesting exercise Matt.
FYI re: the topic of Rickenbacker drawing Cincinnati/Dayton fliers, I can tell you that living 10 minutes from airport in Asheville, NC, I still drive to Charlotte (2 hours each way) often to get direct flights. Let's say at least 25% of the time.
As an aside on these AI bots, I had dinner with some former co-workers last weekend. One of them is a 70ish year old former marketing VP; she is still teaching business and marketing at the University of Cincinnati. She is single and refers to ChatGPT as her "fiancee" - she regularly queries it and it responds like a loving partner confirming how smart and savvy she is. I found it just a bit eerie for my tastes but she was entirely comfortable with the experience. To each their own I suppose.